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Adam Clulow challenges the conventional understanding of European power in Asia, which is 
that “the ‘rise of Europe’ began with the voyages of exploration in 1492 or 1497 and continued, 
marching according to the relentless beat of some great drum, in subsequent centuries” 
(p. 262), and that, in the end, “Asian states either adapted to claim a place in a Western-
dominated world order in the nineteenth century or succumbed to a colonial embrace” (p. 9). 
True, the European dominance in Asia took hold in the mid-nineteenth century; however, as 
Clulow notes, it was “relatively brief” (p. 10), and before that Europeans had been subordinate 
to powerful Asian states such as Japan and China for a much longer period. In The Company 
and the Shogun, Clulow analyzes the encounter between the Dutch East India Company (VOC) 
and Tokugawa Japan, and aptly debunks Eurocentric versions of history by showing “how 
Europeans adapted to find a place in Asian-dominated political orders” (p. 10).
Examining how the VOC “was domesticated, confined within a self-designated role as 
vassal, and saddled with a raft of attached responsibilities” (p. 261) in Tokugawa Japan, Clulow 
draws on the notion of “contained conflict” (p. 9), which, Sanjay Subrahmanyam suggests, 
stands in contrast to the idea of “an age of partnership” (p. 8). The VOC, which was chartered 
in 1602 and given rights to diplomacy, violence, and sovereignty, found itself from the 
seventeenth century to 1850 “compelled to give ground, albeit always in different ways, and 
to retreat from its insistence on its proper rights and sovereign privileges” (p. 260) when it had 
to deal with the Tokugawa regime in order to gain access to Japanese markets. By focusing on 
a sequence of conflicts that pushed the VOC into “a process of socialization” (p. 262) within 
the Tokugawa order, Clulow charts the trajectory that eventually led to the Dutch being made 
“loyal vassals of the shogun” (p. 17).
Indeed, the Dutch were forced to adapt to the Tokugawa system once they reached 
Hirado, Japan, in 1608. Clulow addresses the three themes of diplomacy, violence, and 
sovereignty, and traces how the VOC was socialized through its confrontations with the 
Tokugawa bakufu. First, in a detailed analysis of the VOC’s 1627 mission under Pieter Nuyts, 
Clulow details how “the company’s clumsy sleight of hand” (p. 93) with regard to its claim to 
the right of diplomacy failed to budge the Tokugawa bakufu. Instead, the VOC found itself 
forced to “participate in the same ceremonies mandated of the shogun’s other subordinates” (p. 
96) —ceremonies that had to be executed in the form of paying annual homage by prostrating 
oneself to the shogun.
The VOC was a maritime organization “specifically geared toward seaborne warfare” 
(p. 135), and it had at its command a formidable combination of heavy guns and robust, well-
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designed ships. In brushing off competitors, the VOC engaged in the violence associated 
with privateering. In Tokugawa Japan, “the [Dutch] company encountered a state with very 
limited maritime resources” (p. 139). However, as Clulow notes: “for all these facts, it was 
the company that found itself strikingly powerless on the seas around Japan” (p. 139). Why? 
According to Clulow, this was because “the VOC became entangled within a Tokugawa 
legal order in which its freedom to act against its three primary competitors—Japan-based 
merchants, the Portuguese, and Chinese traders—was significantly constrained” (p. 139). By 
the “Tokugawa legal order,” Clulow means the Japanese system of maritime passes known 
as shuinjō—a system according to which the bakufu treated any attack on a trading vessel 
in possession of a legitimate pass “as a direct challenge to its authority” (p. 144). The Dutch, 
who casually and regularly used privateering in other parts of Asia, “never turned their guns 
against Japan-based shipping to force Tokugawa officials to change policies or alter treading 
conditions” (p. 142). Clulow attributes this to “the nature of the [Tokugawa] regime’s legal 
markers” (p. 139), which outlawed the VOC’s use of violence against any vessel related to 
Tokugawa Japan.
But one might wonder why the VOC was so fearful of violating Tokugawa Japan’s 
maritime pass system. Clulow does not provide an answer, other than to say that the VOC 
was hopelessly entangled with the Tokugawa legal order even though the latter was not backed 
by any real naval power. However, it should be noted that the Tokugawa regime exercised firm 
and exclusive control over Japan’s vibrant domestic markets, to which the Dutch were eager to 
gain access. If the Japanese markets, which were a lucrative source of trade for the Dutch, were 
to be closed, their voyage to Japan would be rendered useless. No matter how formidable the 
VOC’s naval power, it could never be a match for Tokugawa Japan’s formidable ground forces, 
which protected the country’s silver mines and markets. The VOC was an organization of 
merchants, and it was in pursuit of money, not power.
Finally, in examining sovereignty disputes between the VOC and the Tokugawa regime, 
Clulow sheds light on the VOC’s colony, which was set up in Tayouan. Japan-based merchants 
who conducted business in Tayouan had a series of clashes with the new intruder, the VOC. 
The news that Nuyts, the VOC governor of the Tayouan colony, had arrested Japanese 
merchants and sailors reached Japan and immediately outraged Tokugawa officials. To remedy 
this perceived infringement of Japanese sovereignty, the Tokugawa regime demanded that 
the VOC hand Nuyts over to Japan. The VOC thereupon abandoned its “insistence on the 
inviolability of its sovereign rights in favor of a more accommodating policy” (p. 207), and 
delivered Nuyts to Japan. Only after the VOC had presented a glittering brass chandelier, 
which would be installed at the Nikkō mausoleum as a symbol of its subordination to the 
Tokugawa bakufu, was Nuyts allowed to return to Batavia.
On the whole, Clulow offers an excellent analysis of how the VOC adapted itself to “a 
decidedly unequal relationship” (p. 259) with Tokugawa Japan—one in which “Asia occupied 
a position at the center … [and] Europeans were forced to adapt in order to claim a place in 
a political order that they could do little to alter” (p. 21). The Company and the Shogun is a 
welcome contribution to the field of international relations in premodern East Asia, which 
desperately needs to abandon its outdated Eurocentrism.
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